Knowledge and common knowledge in a Byzantine environment: Crash failures  by Dwork, Cynthia & Moses, Yoram
INFORMATION AND COMPUTATION 88, 156-186 (1990) 
Knowledge and Common Knowledge in a 
Byzantine Environment: Crash Failures 
CYNTHIA DWORK 
IBM Almaden Research Center, 
Sun Jose. Cali&ornia 95 120 
YORAM MOSES 
Department of Applied Math and CS, 
The Wei:mann Institute of Science. 
Rehovot, 76100 Israel 
By analyzing the states of knowledge that the processors attain in an unreliable 
system of a simple type, we capture some of the basic underlying structure of such 
systems. In particular. we study what facts become common knowledge at various 
points in the execution of protocols in an unreliable system. This characterizes the 
simultaneous actions that can be carried out in such systems. For example, we 
obtain a complete characterization of the number of rounds required to reach 
simultaneous Byzantine agreement, given the pattern in which failures occur. From 
this we derive a new protocol for this problem that is optimal in all runs, rather 
than just always matching the worst-case lower bound. In some cases this protocol 
attains simultaneous Byzantine agreement in as few as two rounds. We also present 
a nontrivial simultaneous agreement problem called biualent agreement for which 
there is a protocol that always halts in two rounds. Our analysis applies to 
simultaneous actions in general, and not just to Byzantine agreement. The lower 
bound proofs presented here generalize and simplify the previously known 
proofs. c 1990 Academic Press, Inc 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of designing effective protocols for distributed systems 
whose components are unreliable is both important and difficult. In 
general, a protocol for a distributed system in which all components are 
liable to fail cannot unconditionally guarantee to achieve nontrivial goals. 
In particular, if all processors in the system fail at an early stage of an 
execution of the protocol, then fairly little will be achieved regardless of 
what actions the protocol intended for the processors to perform. However, 
such universal failures are not very common in practice, and we are often 
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faced with the problem of seeking protocols that will function correctly so 
long as the number, type, and pattern of failures during the execution of 
the protocol are reasonably limited. A requirement that is often made of 
such protocols is t-resiliency-that they be guaranteed to achieve a 
particular goal so long as no more than t processors fail. 
A good example of a desirable goal for a protocol in an unreliable 
system, embodying some of the fundamental issues of such environments, 
is called simultaneous Byzantine agreement (SBA), a variant of the 
Byzantine agreement problem introduced in [ PSL] : 
Given are n processors, at most t of which might be faulty. Each 
processor pi has an initial value xi E (0, 1 }. Required is a protocol with the 
following properties: 
1. Every non-faulty processor pi irreversibly “decides” on a value 
.YiG (0, 11. 
2. The non-faulty processors all decide on the same value. 
3. The non-faulty processors all decide simultaneously, i.e., in the 
same round of computation. 
4. If all initial values xi are identical, then all non-faulty processors 
decide xi. 
Throughout the paper we will use t to denote an upper bound on the 
number of faulty processors. We call a distributed system whose processors 
are unreliable an unreliable environment. 
A number of recent papers have looked at the role of knowledge in 
distributed computing (cf. Chandy and Misra, 1986; Halpern and 
Moses, 1984; Parikh and Ramanujam, 1985). They suggest that knowledge 
is an important conceptual abstraction for distributed systems and that the 
design and analysis of distributed protocols may benefit from explicitly 
reasoning about the states of knowledge that the system goes through 
during an execution of the protocol. In (Halpern and Moses, 1984), special 
attention is given to states of knowledge of groups of processors, with the 
states of common knowledge and implicit knowledge’ singled out as states of 
knowledge that are of particular interest. Informally, a fact is common 
knowledge to a particular group if everybody knows it, everybody knows 
that everybody knows it, and so on ad infinitum; a fact is implicitly known 
by the group if someone who knew what all members of the group know, 
would know this fact. Among other things, they show that common 
knowledge is intimately related to simultaneous actions-actions that are 
I The term implicit knowledge has been changed to distributed know/edge in the most recent 
version of Halpern and Moses (1984); we remain with “implicit knowledge” in part for 
consistency with Moses and Tuttle (1988). 
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guaranteed to take place simultaneously at all sites of the system. As we 
shall see, processors running a protocol for SBA can decide on a particular 
value u only once certain facts about the initial values xi become common 
knowledge. The problem of attaining common knowledge of a given fact in 
an unreliable environment turns out to be a direct generalization of the 
SBA problem. 
This paper studies the structure and properties of t-resilient protocols 
that perform simultaneous actions by investigating what facts can become 
common knowledge at different points in the execution of a t-resilient 
protocol. We restrict our attention to systems in which communication is 
synchronous and reliable, and the only type of processor faults possible are 
crash failures: a faulty processor might crash at some point, after which it 
sends no messages at all. In the sequel we will use SBA as our standard 
example of a desirable simultaneous action. 
We show that the pattern in which failures occur completely determines 
the number of rounds required to attain common knowledge of facts about 
the initial state of the system. Consequently, we obtain a complete charac- 
terization of the patterns of failures that force a t-resilient protocol for 
SBA to take k rounds, for 2 <k d t + 1. This generalizes the well-known 
fact that SBA requires t + 1 rounds in the worst case (cf. DeMillo et 
al., 1982; Dolev and Strong, 1982; Coan and Dwork, 1986; Fischer and 
Lynch, 1982; Hadzilacos, 1983; Lamport and’Fischer, 1982). Our proof is a 
simplification of the well-known lower bound proof for SBA. Interestingly, 
our analysis immediately suggests a protocol for SBA that is optimal in all 
YUIZS. That is, it always halts as early as possible, given the pattern in which 
failures occur. In many cases, this turns out to be much earlier than in any 
protocol previously known. This is the first protocol for SBA that is 
optimal in all runs. In fact, it is the first protocol for SBA that euer halts 
before the end of round t + 1. 
The analysis presented in this paper applies to a large class of 
simultaneous actions, not only to SBA. For example, we present the 
bivalent agreement poblem, in which clause (4) of SBA is replaced by a 
requirement that the protocol have at least one run in which the processors 
decide 0, and at least one run in which they decide 1. We derive a protocol 
that always reaches bivalent agreement in two rounds. This contradicts a 
fo1.k conjecture in the field that states that performing any nontrivial task 
simultaneously in an unreliable environment requires t + 1 rounds in the 
worst case. 
The main contribution of this paper is to illustrate how a knowledge- 
based analysis of protocols in an unreliable environment can provide 
insight into the fundamental properties of such systems. This insight is very 
useful in the design of improved t-resilient protocols for Byzantine agree- 
ment and many related problems. The analysis also provides some insight 
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into how assumptions about the reliability of the system affect the states of 
knowledge attainable in the system. We briefly consider some other 
reliability assumptions and apply our analysis to them. 
Since this paper was first written, the second author and Mark Tuttle 
have studied the question of how to optimally solve simultaneous choice 
problems, a large class of problems generalizing SBA, in variants of the 
omissions failure model. They completely characterize and provide effective 
ways for computing what facts are common knowledge at any point in a 
run, for variants of the ommisions failure model. Their work, in particular, 
also applies to the crash failure model and generalizes some of our results; 
see Moses and Tuttle (1988). However, the notions of a clean round and 
the waste of a run, on which the current paper is based, do not apply in 
the more general variants of the omissions failure model, and shed 
considerable light on the structure of SBA and other simultaneous choice 
problems in the crash failure model. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the basic defini- 
tions and some of the fundamental properties of our model of a distributed 
system and of knowledge in a distributed system. Section 3 investigates the 
states of knowledge attainable in a particular fairly general protocol. 
Section 4 contains an analysis of the lower bounds corresponding to the 
analysis of Section 3, simplifying and generalizing the well-known t + 1 
round worst-case lower bound for SBA. Section 5 discusses some applica- 
tions of our analysis to problems related to SBA, and Section 6 provides 
some concluding remarks. 
2. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
In this section we present a number of basic definitions that will be used 
in the rest of the paper, and discuss some of their implications. Our treat- 
ment will generally follow along the lines of Halpern and Moses (1984). 
Both in this and in later sections we will occasionally use terminology 
developed in Moses and Tuttle (1988). 
2.1. The Model 
We consider a synchronous distributed system consisting of a finite 
collection of n > 2 processors (automata) {pl, pz, . . . . p,}, each pair of 
which is connected by a two-way communication link. The processors 
share a discrete global clock that starts out at time 0 and advances by 
increments of one. Communication in the system proceeds in a sequence of 
rounds, with round k taking place between time k - 1 and time k. In each 
round, every processor first sends the messages it needs to send to other 
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processors, and then it receives the messages that were sent to it by other 
processors in the same round. The identity of the sender and destination of 
each message, as well as the round in which it is sent, are assumed to be 
part of the message. At any given time, a processor’s message history 
consists of the set of messages it has sent and received. In addition to com- 
municating with other processors, a processor can perform certain internal 
actions between rounds of communication, of which we will mainly be 
concerned with the actions of deciding on a value y E (0, 1 }, and of halting. 
Every processor p starts out with some initial state (T. A processor’s view 
at any given time consists of its processor name, initial state, message 
history, and the time on the global clock. We think of the processors as 
following a protocol, which specifies for all k 30 exactly what internal 
actions each processor should take at time k, and what messages each pro- 
cessor is required to send in round k + 1, as a deterministic function of the 
processor’s view at time k. However, a processor might be faulty, in which 
case it might commit a crash failure at an arbitrary round k > 0. If a pro- 
cessor commits a crash failure at round k (or simply fails at round k), then 
it obeys its protocol in all rounds preceding round k, it does not send any 
messages in the rounds following k, and in round k it sends an arbitrary 
(not necessarily strict) subset of the messages it is required to send by its 
protocol. (Since a failed processor sends no further messages, we need not 
make any assumptions regarding what messages it receives in its failing 
round and in later rounds.) For technical reasons, we assume that once a 
processor fails, its view becomes a distinguished failed view. The set A of 
active processors at time k consists of all of the processors that did not fail 
in the first k rounds. 
A run p of such a system is a complete history of its behavior, from time 
0 until the end of time. This includes each processor’s initial state, message 
history, and, if the processor fails, the round in which it fails. A point is a 
pair (p, k), where p is a run and k is a natural number. We will use (p, k) 
to refer to the state of p after its first k rounds. A point (p, k) is said to be 
a point of S if p E S. We denote processor p’s view at (p, k) by u(p, p, k). 
Furthermore, we will sometimes parameterize the set A of active processors 
with the particular point, denoted A(p, k). The list CJ of the processors’ 
initial states is called the system’s initial configuration. 
We will find it useful to talk about the pattern in which failures occur in 
a given run. Formally, a failure pattern rc is a set of triples of the form 
(p, k(p), Q(p)), where p is a processor, k(p) is a round number, and Q(p) 
is a set of processors. A run p displays the failure pattern rc if (i) every pro- 
cessor that fails in p is the first element of some triple in n and (ii) for every 
triple ( p, k(p), Q(p)) in 7~ it is the case that processor p fails in round k(p) 
of p, in round k(p) it sends no messages to processors in Q(p), and it does 
send messages to all processors not in Q(p) to which the protocol 
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prescribes it to send.* We call the pair consisting of the initial configuration 
of a run together with its failure pattern the operating environment of the 
run. A protocol 9, and an operating environment (a, n) uniquely deter- 
mine a run. (However, a run may result from more than one protocol, and 
more than one failure pattern.) We denote this run by P(a, rr). Two runs 
of different protocols that have the same operating environment are called 
corresponding runs. 
We identify a distributed system with the set S of the possible runs of a 
particular fixed protocol 9 = (P( 1 ), . . . . P(n)), where P(i) is the part of the 
protocol processor pi follows. This set essentially encodes all of the relevant 
information about the execution of the protocol in the system. Given a 
system S, for 16 i< n let ,Ei be the set of initial states that processor pi 
assumes in the runs of S. The system S is said to be a t-uniform system for 
9 if there is a set of initial configurations rs C, x . . . x C, such that S is 
the set of all runs of the protocol 9 starting in initial configurations from 
r in which at most t processors fail. t-uniform systems have the property 
that a processor failure is independent of the initial configuration and of 
the time at which other processors fail. A system is said to be independent 
if its set of initial configurations is of the form C, x . . x C,. In an indepen- 
dent t-uniform system there is no necessary dependence between the initial 
states of the different processors. The properties of t-resilient protocols can 
be studied by analyzing particular t-uniform systems for them. For example, 
a given protocol is a t-resilient protocol for SBA if all runs of the independent 
t-uniform system in which the set of possible initial configurations is 
(0, 1 }” satisfy the requirements of SBA. 
2.2. Facts and Knowledge 
We assume the existence of an underlying logical language for represent- 
ing ground facts about the system. By ground we mean facts about the state 
of the system that do not explicitly mention processors’ knowledge. For- 
mally, a ground fact cp will be identified with a set of points r(cp) E S x IV, 
where N is the set of natural numbers. Given a run p E S of the system and 
a time k, we will say that cp holds at (p, k), denoted (S, p, k) + cp, iff 
(p, k) E z(q). We will define various ground facts as we go along. The set 
of points corresponding to these facts will be clear from the context. We 
close this language under the standard boolean connectives A , 1, and 2, 
interpreted as the standard conjunction, negation, and implication. 
Given a system S, we now define what facts a processor is said to 
‘We remark that the triples (p, k, 0) and (p, k + 1, {p,, . . ..p.}) are not equivalent. 
While they result in the same behavior as far as message transmission is concerned, the former 
may only appear in runs in which p fails in round k, while the latter appears in runs in which 
p fails in round k + 1; recall that the round in which p fails is an explicit part of the run. 
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“know” at any given point (p, k) of S. Roughly speaking, p, is said to know 
a fact $ if $ is guaranteed to hold, given p;s view of the run. More 
formally, given a system S, we say that two points (p, k) and (p’, k’) of S 
are pi-equivalent, denoted (p, k) A (p’, k’), iff u(p,, p, k) = u(p,, p’, k’). (In 
our setting, the only case in which v(p,, p, k) = u(p,, p’, k’) is possible for 
k’ # k is when v(p,, p, k) = u(p,, p’, k’) =fuiled.) We say that a processor pi 
knows a fact $ in S at (p, k), denoted (S, p, k) + Kill/, if (S, p’, k’) /= + for 
all points (p’, k’) E S x N satisfying (p, k) 0 (p’, k’). This delinition of 
knowledge is essentially the complete-history interpretation of Halpern and 
Moses (1984). We now review some of the properties of knowledge under 
this definition. 
A formula cp is said to be valid, denoted k cp, if it is true of all points in 
all systems. Given a system S, a formula is said to be ualid in S, denoted 
S + cp, if it is true of all points of S. It follows that a fact is valid iff it is 
valid in S for all systems S. The following proposition summarizes the 
well-known fact (cf. Halpern and Moses, 1984, 1985) that under our 
definition of knowledge Ki satisfies the axioms of the modal system S5: 
PROPOSITION 1. (a) 1’S + cp then S b K,cp. 
(b) The consequence closure axiom is, valid: 
k CKiP * Ki(Vxq)13Ki+. 
(c) The knowledge axiom is valid: 
I= KiV 1 CP. 
(d) The positive introspection axiom is valid: 
FKK,P zKiK,q. 
(e) The negative introspection axiom is valid: 
b lK,cp~K~lK,cp. 
Roughly speaking, clauses (a) through (e) characterize the modal system 
,635. An operator satisfying clauses (a) through (d) is said to satisfy the 
modal system S4 (cf. Halpern and Moses, 1985). An interesting conse- 
quence of our choice of having a failed processor’s view be a distinguished 
failed view is the fact that a processor always knows whether it is active. 
2.3. Implicit Knowledge 
Having defined knowledge for individual processors, we now extend this 
definition to states of group knowledge. Given a group of processors 
GG {PI. . . . . p,}, we first define G’s view at (p, k), denoted v(G, p, k): 
v(G,~,k)~~ {Np,p,k):p~G}. 
Thus, roughly speaking, G’s view is simply the joint view of its members. 
Extending our definition for individuals’ knowledge, we say that the group 
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G has implicit knowledge of cp at (p, k), denoted (S, p, k) + Z,cp, if for all 
runs p’ E S satisfying u(G, p, k) = u(G, p’, k) it is the case that (S, p’, k) + cp. 
Intuitively, G has implicit knowledge of cp if the joint view of G’s members 
guarantees that cp holds. Notice that if processor p knows cp and processor 
q knows cp 3 $, then together they have implicit knowledge of $, even if 
neither of them knows + individually. An identical proof to that of 
Proposition 1 now shows: 
PROPOSITION 2. The operator I, satisfies the modal system SS (clauses 
(a) through (e) of Proposition 1, substituting I, for Kj). 
We refer the reader to Halpern and Moses (1984, 1985) for a discussion 
and a formal treatment of I,. In the current paper we are mainly interested 
in states of knowledge of the group A of active processors. We say that the 
set of active processors implicitly knows cp, denoted Iv, exactly if Z,cp holds 
for the set G = A. Stated more formally, 
(S, P, k) I= Iv iff (S, P, k) b kcp for G = 4, k). 
Although Zcp is defined in terms of Z,cp, it is not the case that Z and ZG have 
the same properties. The reason for this is that whereas G is a fixed set, 
membership in A may vary over time and differs from one run to another. 
In particular, it is often the case that for G=A(p, k) we have 
(S, p, k) # Z,(A = G), because there is some run p’ E S such that 
u(G, p, k) = o(G, p’, k) and where G is a strict subset of A($, k). (Notice, 
however, that Z(G g A) holds whenever G GA.) For example, consider two 
runs p and p’ that have the same initial configuration, in both of which 
processor p, sends processor p2 a message in round 1 stating p,‘s initial 
value and fails before sending any other message. Processor pz successfully 
sends all of its round 1 messages to processors other than p1 in both runs. 
However, processor p2 fails in round 1 of p to send a message to pl, while 
in p’ it does not fail at all. All other processors behave in an identical 
fashion in both runs. Notice that the view of all processors other than p2 
at time 1 is the same in both runs. pi’s initial value is not implicitly known 
at (p, l), while it is implicitly known at (p’, 1). Since the processors active 
at (p, 1) have the same joint view at both points, they do not know at 
(p, 1) that pi’s initial value is not implicitly known. Consequently, whereas 
the negative introspection axiom for I,, i.e., lZ,cp 3 ZG lZ,cp, is valid, 
the corresponding formula for Z, -IZCQ z~ I llq, is not valid. The above 
discussion can be summarized by: 
PROPOSITION 3. The implicit knowledge operator Z satisfies the modal 
system S4 (i.e., clauses (at(d) of Proposition 1). The negative introspection 
axiom is not valid for I. 
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The following lemma describes the relationship between Kj and I: 
LEMMA 4. Let cp be a formula and let pin A(p, k). lf (S, p, k) + K,cp 
then 
(a) (S, P, k) k 1~; and 
(b) (ST P, k) k KiZV. 
Proof: For part (a), assume that (S, p, k) + Kicp, and let (p’, k’) be a 
point satisfying v(A(p, k), p’, k’) = u(A(p, k), p, k). In particular, since 
pie A(p, k) we have that v(p,, p’, k’) = u(p,, p, k), and thus since K,cp holds 
at (p, k), we have that cp holds at (p’, k’). Since this is true for all such 
points (p’, k’), it follows by the definition of +for implicit knowledge that 
(S, p, k) + Zqx For (b), let (S, p, k) k K,cp and let (p’, k’) be p,-equivalent 
to (p, k). By Proposition l(d) we have that (S, p, k) + K,K,(p, and hence 
that (S, p’, k’) t= K,cp. By part (a) we get that (S, p’, k’) +Zex It thus 
follows that (S, p, k) + KiZqx [ 
We now show that, roughly speaking, in t-uniform systems, facts about 
the past cannot spontaneously become implicitly known. A fact about the 
past that is not implicitly known is lost forever and will not become 
implicit knowledge at a later time. To make this precise, we define a fact 
cp to be a fact about the run in a given system S, if its truth depends only 
on the run, which formally means that for all runs p E S and times k, k’ it 
is the case that (S, p, k) + cp iff(S, p, k’) + cp. If (S, p, k) + cp for a fact q 
about the run, we say that the run p satisfies cp. Similarly, we say that a 
fact I/I is about the first k rounds in a given system S, if it is a fact about 
the run that is determined by the first k rounds. More formally, we require 
that for all runs p, p’ E S such that for all processors p and times 1 d k we 
have v(p, p, Z) = u(p, p’, Z), it is the case that p satisfies $ iff p’ satisfies $. 
In particular, facts about the initial configuration are facts about the first 
0 rounds. Notice that a direct consequence of the definition is that a fact 
about the first m rounds is also a fact about the first k rounds, for all 
k>m. We now have: 
THEOREM 5. Let S be a t-uniform system, let II/ be a fact about the first 
m rounds, and let 1~ m. For all I> k 2 m we have: 
If (ST P> 1) I= w  then (s, ~7 k) I= Iti. 
Proof Given that a fact about the first m rounds is in particular also 
a fact about the first k rounds for all k >, m, it suffices to prove the claim 
for facts I,$ that are about the first k rounds. We will prove the 
contrapositive: If (S, p, k) # Z$ then (S, p, 1) p I$. Let I> k, and let p 
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and + be such that Ic/ is about the first k rounds and (S, p, k) p I$. 
Let G = A(p, k). It follows that there exists a run p’ E S such that 
u(G, p, k) = v(G, p’, k), and (S, p’, k) p I/. Observe that A($, k) 3 G. Let p” 
be a run with the following properties: (i) the initial configurations and first 
k rounds of p’ and p” are identical; (ii) all processors in A(p’, k) - G fail 
in round k + 1 of p” before sending any messages; and (iii) from round 
k + 1 on all processors in G behave in p” exactly as they do in p. Condition 
(i) implies in particular that all processors in G have the same views at time 
k in p, p’, and p”. Given that the only processors that take active part in 
p” after time k are those in G = A(p, k), which follows from (ii), a 
straightforward induction on the round number k’ > k shows that (p’, k) 
can be extended to the run p” as specified in condition (iii). By construc- 
tion, the number of processors that fail by time k in p” is no larger than 
the number in p, and exactly the same processors fail in p and in p” by any 
later time. Given that S is a r-uniform system and p E S, no more than t 
processors fail in p. In addition, p” has the same initial configuration as 
p’ E S. It follows that p” ES, since all of the processors follow the same 
protocol in p” and in p, and no more than t processors fail in p”. By 
construction of p” we also have that A(p”, 1) = A(p, 1) and that the active 
processors have identical views in (p”, I) and in (p, I). Since $ is a fact 
about the first k rounds and the first k rounds of p” and p’ are identical, 
we have that (S, p”, I) k $. This immediately implies that (S, p, I) l# f$, 
and we are done. 1 
Fagin and Vardi (1986) perform an analysis of implicit knowledge in 
reliable systems. Among other things, they prove that the set of facts that 
are implicit knowledge about the initial configuration does not change over 
time. That is, in reliable systems the implication in the statement of 
Theorem 5 becomes an equivalence. However, in t-uniform Byzantine 
systems it is clearly the case that implicit knowledge can be “lost.” For 
example, if processor pi may start in initial states x and x’, and in a 
particular run of the system pi starts in state x and fails in the first round 
before sending any messages, then whereas I (pi started in state x) holds at 
time 0, it does not hold at any later time. 
2.4. Common Knowledge 
We now introduce the two other states of group knowledge that are 
central to our analysis. We define “everyone knows” and “common 
knowledge” along the lines of Halpern and Moses (1984). In our case, 
however, these notions will be defined for the set A of active processors. 
Every (active) processor knows cp, denoted Eq, is defined by 
Eq ‘!? A (p,~A1K~cp). 
I <i<.,l 
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An immediate corollary of Lemma 4 which we will find useful in the sequel 
is: 
COROLLARY 6. /=EqxE(Zq). 
We define E’cp 2’ Eq and E” + ’ cp dzf E(E”(p) for m 3 1. A fact rp is said 
to be common knowledge among the active processors, denoted Cp, if E”cp 
holds for all m >, 1. Alternatively, 
Cq = Eq A E’cp A . . A E”cp A 1.. . 
Common knowledge among the active processors, which we will simply 
call “common knowledge,” will play a crucial role in the sequel. We now 
study some of its properties. A useful tool for thinking about E”cp and CIJY 
is the labelled undirected gaph whose nodes are the points of a system S, 
and whose edges are the A relations, restricted so that an edge e ct-* e’ 
exists only if pi is active in e (and hence also in e’). (This graph is precisely 
the Kripke structure modelling the active processors’ knowledge in the 
system; cf. Halpern and Moses, 1985.) The distance between two points 
e = (p, k) and e’ = (p’, k) in this graph, denoted 6(e, e’), is simply the length 
of the shortest path in the graph connecting e and e’. If there is no path 
connecting e to e’, then 6(e, e’) is defined to be infinity. Two points e and 
e’ are said to be similar, denoted ewe’ if 6(e, e’) is finite (i.e., if e’ and e 
are in the same connected component of the graph). Equivalently, 
(p, k) w  (p’, k), if for some finite m there are runs pr , pZ ,..., pm-, E S, and 
processors pi,, pi?, . . . . pi,, satisfying~~,EA(p,, k) forj<m- 1, pj,~A(p’, k), 
and 
(p, k) +% (p,, k) +-% ...e--t (pm-,, k) +f% (p’, k). 
(The system S will generally be clear from context, and thus we do 
not parameterize N by the system S.) It is now easy to check that 
(S, p, k) ( = Eq iff (S, p’, k) + cp for all points (p’, k) of distance at most 1 
from (p, k). Notice that similarity is an equivalence relation. We can now 
show: 
PROPOSITION 7. (a) C satisfies the modai system S5 (see Proposition 1). 
(b) (S, p, k) k Cq iff (S, p’, k) t= cp for all p’ E S such that (p, k) - 
(P’, k). 
(c) The induction rule holds for C: If S + cp 1 Eq then S + cp 3 Ccp. 
(d) The Iixpoint axiom is valid: + Cq I E(cp A Cp). 
ProoJ The proof of part (a) is identical to the analogous proofs in 
Halpem and Moses (1984, 1985). To prove part (b), a straightforward 
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induction on m first shows that (S, p, k) + E”cp iff (S, p’, k) + cp for all 
points (p’, k) of distance at most m from (p, k). Thus, (S, p, k) /= Q iff 
(S, p’, k) k cp for all p’ such that (p’, k) N (p, k) and we are done. Part (c) 
follows again from a straightforward induction on the distance between 
points in the connected components of the similarity graph. For part (d), 
clearly Cq 1 Eq, and we need to show that Cq I> ECrp. This follows from 
part (b) by the observation that any two neihgboring points in the 
similarity graph have exactly the same connected component in this graph. 
It follows that + Cq 1 ECq and we are done. 1 
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the case of implicit knowledge, 
the basic properties of E and C (which we have defined here relative to the 
set of active processors) are the same as those of E, and C,, stated in 
Halpern and Moses (1984). Proposition 7(b) provides a graph-theoretic 
interpretation of common knowledge, which is both conceptually and 
technically very useful: a fact is common knowledge at a given point 
exactly if this fact holds at all points that are in the same connected compo- 
nent. This will be used time and again in our analysis. 
Proposition 7 is very useful in relating common knowledge and 
simultaneous actions-actions that are guaranteed to be performed 
simultaneously. For example, we can use Proposition 7(c) in order to relate 
the ability or inability to attain common knowledge of certain facts 
with the possibility or impossibility of reaching simultaneous Byzantine 
agreement. We now have: 
THEOREM 8. Let S be a system in which the processors follow a protocol 
for SBA, let decide(v) = “the active processors are currently deciding on the 
value v”, and let exist(u) = “At least one processor had v as its initial value.” 
Then 
(a) S k decide(u) 1 Cdecide( a), and 
(b) S + decide(v) 1 Cexist(o). 
Prooj Given that the protocol guarantees that SBA is attained in S, it 
is the case that whenever some processor decides u, all active processors 
do, and thus the formula decide(u) 3 Edecide(v) is valid in S. By 
Proposition 7(c) it follows that decide(v) 3 Cdecide(u) is valid in S, and 
we are done with part (a). For (b), notice that SBA guarantees 
that S k decide(v) =~exist(v). Since C satisfies S5, we also have that 
S + C(decide(v) 3 exist(v)). By part (a) we now have that 
S + decide(u) 1 [C(decide(v)) A C(decide(v) 3 exist(v))]. 
Finally, by consequence closure for C we obtain that S b decide(v) 1 
C(exist(v)), and we are done. 1 
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This theorem shows that achieving common knowledge of certain facts 
is a necessary condition for SBA. Whereas part (a) relates the decision act 
itself to attaining common knowledge that the processors are deciding, 
which is a protocol-dependent fact, part (b) relates it to attaining common 
knowledge of the existence of a certain initial value, which is an objective 
fact about the initial configuration. In the following sections we will see 
that attaining common knowledge of such objective facts about the initial 
configuration is in a precise sense a necessary and suflicient condition for 
SBA, and this will be used as a crucial step in the design of a protocol 
for SBA. 
3. ANALYSIS OF A SIMPLE PROTOCOL 
In this section we take a close look at independent t-uniform systems S, 
( = S,(t)), in which all processors follow a simple and fairly general 
protocol 9 : 
For k >, 0, in round k + 1 each processor sends its view at time 
k (i.e., after k rounds) to all other processors. 
This is the well-known full information protocol (cf. Pease et al., 1980). 
We say that a fact is about the operating environment if its truth depends 
only on the operating environment. (Recall that the operating environment 
of a run consists of its initial configuration and failure pattern; two runs are 
corresponding runs if they have the same operating environment.) Thus, 
facts about the initial configuration and the failure pattern are facts about 
the operating environment. Intuitively, since a full information protocol 
requires that all processors send all of the information available to them in 
every round, one would expect this protocol to give each processor as 
much information about the operating environment as any protocol could. 
This intuition is formalized in the following theorem: 
THEOREM 9 (Moses and Tuttle). Let cp be a fact about the operating 
environment. Let p be a run of S, and [ be a corresponding run of an 
independent t-uniform system S generated by an arbitrary protocol 9. 
If (S, i, 0 t= Cv then (S,, P, 0 I= CT. 
The proof of Theorem 9 is based on a lemma with more general implica- 
tions, stating that if a processor has the same view at time I in two runs 
of SF, then it has the same views at time I in the corresponding runs of 
S. The lemma is proved by induction on I. This lemma implies that the 
connected components of the similarity graph of S,, are a refinement 
of those of S. It follows that if cp holds throughout a point’s connected 
CRASH FAILURES 169 
component in the system S, then it will necessarily hold throughout the 
corresponding point’s component in S,. This implies the theorem. For 
details, see Lemma 5 and Corollary 6 of Moses and Tuttle (1988). 
Given that the full information protocol makes facts about the initial 
configuration common knowledge as soon as any protocol can, we now 
turn to study when facts about the initial conliguration become common 
knowledge in runs of 5. 
A fact cp is called stable if once it becomes true it remains true forever. 
For example, facts about the first k rounds, and in particular facts about 
the system’s initial conliguration, are stable. Since a processor’s knowledge 
is based on the processor’s view, and an active processor’s view at any given 
time determines its view at all previous times, it is the case that if rp is 
stable then so are Eq and Cq As we have seen, Zcp is not necessarily stable. 
3.1. Clean Rounds 
We say that the failure of a processor p is discovered in round k in a given 
run if time k is the first time at which p’s failure is implicitly known. Notice 
that if p’s failure is discovered in round k of a run p, then p failed to send 
a round k message to some processor in A(p, k). That is, the active pro- 
cessors cannot learn in round k of p’s failure in an earlier round, say from 
some processor q to which p failed to send a message in round k - 1. This 
is because q was active at time k - 1 and hence p’s failure would have been 
discovered in round k - 1 and not in round k. 
We now come to a notion that will play a crucial role in our analysis of 
common knowledge in the crash failure model. A round in which no new 
processor failure is discovered is called a clean round. A round that is not 
clean we call dirty. Note that clean rounds resemble, but do not coincide 
with, rounds in which no processors actually fail. A round in which a 
processor fails may be clean, provided no processor active at the end of 
the round has noticed the failure (the following round, however, will 
necessarily be dirty). Conversely, a round in which no failure occurs might 
be dirty, in case a failure in the previous round is discovered for the first 
time only in the current round. Clean rounds are of interest because they 
make implicitly known facts known to every active processor; more 
precisely, all stable facts that are implicitly known at the start of a clean 
round, become known to every active processor after the clean round. This 
is formalized in the following theorem: 
THEOREM 10. Let cp be a stable fact such that (S,, p, k- 1) +Zq. If 
round k of p is clean then (S,, p, k) + Eqx 
Proof: By definition, (S,,p,k-l)~Z~iff(S,,p,k-l)~Z,cp for 
G = A(p, k - 1). If round k is clean then all processors active at time k must 
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receive round k messages from all of the processors in G (otherwise a new 
failure becomes implicitly known). Hence, the view of each active processor 
p at time k contains a copy of v(G, p, k - 1). It follows that, for any point 
(p’, k) indistinguishable to p from (p, k), it is the case that u(G, p’, k - 1) = 
u(G,p,k-l)andhence(S,,p’,k-l)~I~andthus(S,,p’,k-l)~~. 
Since cp is stable, it follows that (S,,, p’, k) + cp as well. It now follows that 
(S,, p, k) + K,cp and, since p was chosen arbitrarily, every active processor 
knows cp at time k in p. 1 
As a result of Theorem 10 and Theorem 5, after a clean round all 
processors know exactly the same facts about the initial configuration. 
Therefore, once it is common knowledge that there was a clean round, it 
is also co,mmon knowledge that the processors have an identical view of 
the initial configuration. This is captured by the following theorem: 
THEOREM 11. Let clean be the fact “a clean round has occurred,” and 
let cp be a fact about the initial configuration. If (S,F, p, I) + Cclean then 
ProoJ First notice that + Cq 3 Iv, so we only need to show the other 
direction. Let cp be a fact about the initial configuration. Let ([, i) be a 
point satisfying (S,F, [, I) k clean. By Theorem 5, if (S,F, [, I) + Iq then 
(S,, [. k) + IQ for all k < 1. Let round k of [ be a clean round, where k < 1. 
(Notice k > 0, since round 1 takes place between times 0 and time 1.) Since 
(S,q, i, k - 1) ‘F Iv, by Theorem 10 we have that (S,, I, k) + Eq. Eq is 
stable because q is, and therefore (S,, <, 1) + Eqx By Corollary 6 we have 
that (S,, c, I) k E(Iq). It follows that (clean A Iv)=, E(Iq) is valid in S,. 
As Cclean 1 ECclean is valid by the fixpoint axiom, we have that 
Cclean A Iv 3 E(Cclean A Icp) is valid in S,, and by the induction rule 
Cclean A Icp 3 C(Cclean A Iv) is valid. Assume that (S,, p, I) k Cclean 
as in the statement of the lemma, and also that (S,, p, 1) k Icp. 
Since C(Cclean A Iq) 2 CIq, and CIcp 3 Cq are both clearly valid, we 
immediately obtain that (S,, p, I) + Cq, and we are done. 1 
As a corollary of Theorem 11 we can now show: 
COROLLARY 12. Let cp be a fact about the initial configuration. Then 
(S,,p,t+l)l=I4J iff (S,,p,t+l)t=:q. 
Proof All runs of S, have the property that no more than t processors 
fail during the run. Given that a processor failure is first discovered in a 
unique round, we have that one of the first t + 1 rounds of every run of S,F 
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must be clean. It follows that at time t + 1 in any run of S, it is common 
knowledge that a clean round has occured. The claim now follows from 
Theorem 11. 1 
3.2. Waste 
As a consequence of Corollary 12 we have that any action that depends 
on the system’s initial configuration can be carried out simultaneously in a 
consistent way by the set of active processors at any time k > t + 1 (if it can 
be carried out at all). This is compatible with the fact that there are well- 
known l-resilient protocols for SBA that attain SBA in t + 1 rounds (see 
Fischer, 1983). Interestingly, none of the known protocols for SBA attain 
SBA in less than t + 1 rounds in an-~ run. Can a protocol for SBA ever 
attain SBA in less than t + 1 rounds? Clearly, once it is common 
knowledge that a clean round has occurred, SBA can be attained. And as 
we shall see, there are cases in which the existence of a clean round 
becomes common knowledge before time t + 1. When the existence of a 
clean round becomes common knowledge depends crucially on the pattern 
of failures, and on the time in which failures become implicitly known to 
the group of active processors. For example, if a processor p detects t 
failures in the first round of a run of -9, then the second round of the run 
will be clean, and at the end of the second round all active processors will 
know that p detected t failures in round 1. The reader can easily check that 
using Proposition 7(c) we have that at the end of round 2 it will be 
common knowledge that p detected t failures in the first round. It then 
follows that it is common knowledge that a clean round occurred and by 
Theorem 11 that all processors have an identical view of the initial 
configuration. (We are abusing the language here slightly. By having an 
identical view of the initial configuration we mean that the processors have 
identical knowledge about the initial configuration.) Clearly, the processors 
can then perform any action that depends on the initial configuration (e.g., 
SBA) in a consistent way. In the remainder of this section we show a class 
of runs of S, in which the processors attain common knowledge of an 
identical view of the initial configuration at time k, for every k between 2 
and t + 1. In the next section, we will prove that this is in fact a precise 
classification of the runs according to the time at which common 
knowledge of an identical view of the initial configuration is attained. 
Intuitively, if more than k failures are discovered by the end of round k, 
then from the point of view of the ability to delay the first clean round, 
failures have been “wasted.” In particular, if for some k it is the case that 
k + j failures are discovered by the end of round k, then there must be a 
clean round by time t + 1 -j (in fact, between round k+ 1 and round 
t + 1 -j). This motivates the following definitions: We denote the number 
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of processors that at time k in run p are implicitly known to have failed by 
J”(p, k). More formally: 
JV-( p, k) = max { j: (S, , p, k) + Z(“j processors have failed”) 1. 
In particular, since S, is t-uniform, we have that -Y’(p, O)=O, as no 
failures are implicitly known at time 0. We define the difference at (p, k), 
denoted d(p, k). by 
d(p, k) gf N(p, k) - k. 
Finally, we define the wastefufness of a run p of S,*, denoted W-(p), by: 
In our logical language, we use w  and d(k) to refer to the “current” run. 
Thus, for example, (S,, p, k) k d(k - 1) <j A w  = 2j holds exactly if 
d(p, k - 1) <j and w(p) = 2j. Notice that since the processors generally do 
not know what run they happen to be in, their knowledge is formulated 
only in terms of YY and d(k). We remark that d(0) = 0 and that d(k) < t - k 
for all k. It follows that d(k) < t - 1 for all k, and thus for all runs p we 
have 0 < W(p) < t - 1. Moreover, since d(t + 1) < 0, it follows that at some 
time f between time 0 and time t the difference reaches its maximum-the 
wastefulness of the run-for the last time. Round k + 1 must be clean, since 
otherwise d(k + 1) 2 d(k), contradicting the choice of I;. This leads us to the 
following: 
LEMMA 13. Zf~(p)~wthen(S,,p,t+l-w)~C(W’3w). 
Proof: We wish to prove that YV 2 w  1 C(-/lr 3 w) is valid at time 
t + 1 - w. More formally, define II/, = (W > w A time = t + 1 - w). We 
prove that S, + $, =, C+,. Let w(q) = w’ > w, and let ff be the largest k 
satisfying d(q, k) = w’ (such a L must exist, since @“(II) = w’ 2 0 and for 
all m >O we have d(q, t +m) ~0). By definition of L, we have 
,ilr(q, &) - /$ = w’. Since JV(~, R) d t, it follows that k < t - w’. Now observe 
that round R + 1 of q must indeed be clean, since d(q, k + 1) < d(q, &). As 
Jlr(q, ,6) = L + w’, we have that (S,, ‘I, 6) k Z (at feast f + w’ processors 
@red). By positive introspection for I and the definition of JV, we 
obtain (S,, 9, &) + Z(J(i) k ff + w’). Equivalently, we have (S,, q, k) k 
Z(d(k) 2 w’), and it follows that (S,, 11, f) + Z(YV 3 M!‘). Since “YY 2 w”’ is 
stable, we have by Theorem 10 that (S,, q, R + 1) + E(?V 2 w’). Now, 
since “E(w >, w’),, is stable and k + 1 d t + 1 - w’ < t + 1 - w, it follows 
that (S,,?,t+l-w)~E(-llrgw’). Moreover, since l=IVw>,w’=,~->w, 
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we obtain that (S,, yl, t + 1 - w) + E(-W 2 w). Finally, given that the 
global time is common kowledge, we have (S,, 9, t + 1 - w) k E$,,. We 
thus obtain that S, k IC/,+ 3 EI),. Our claim that S, + tj, 2 C$., follows 
by the induction rule, and we are done. 1 
We can now use Lemma 13 to prove that the precise waste of a run 
becomes common knowledge at time t + 1 - I^I”. 
THEOREM 14. Zf W(p) = w  then (S,, p, t + 1 - ~1) + C(?Y = w). 
Proof Given Lemma 13, it suffices to show that (S,, p, t + 1 - w) b 
C(W < w). Assume by way of contradiction that (S,, p, t + 1 - w) p 
C(-ly- 6 w). Then there is a point (p’, t + 1 - w) - (p, t + 1 - w) for which 
%‘“(p’) = w’ > w. By Lemma 13 we have (S,, p’, t + 1 - w’) + C(-W B w’) 
and hence also (S,, p’, t + 1 - w’) k C(-llr > w). Since V’ > w” is stable 
and t + 1 - w  > t + 1 - w’, we obtain that (S,, p’, t + 1 - ~1) k C(w > w). 
Given that (p, t + 1 - w) N (p’, t + 1 - w), we have by Proposition 7(b) that 
(S,, p, t - w) + YY > w, contradicting our assumption that w(p) = w. m 
Given that there must always be a clean round in p by time 
t + 1 -w(p), we immediately obtain the following corollary to 
Theorem 14: 
COROLLARY 15. For every run p E S,-, we have 
(S,, p, t + 1 - w(p)) k C (a clean round has occurred). 
Indeed, it is possible to strengthen Corollary 15 even further. A closer 
inspection of the proof of Theorem 14 shows that at time t + 1 -w(p) it 
becomes common knowledge that round i + 1 was clean. Working from an 
earlier version of this paper, Ruben Michel independently observed this 
fact. In Moses and Tuttle (1988), the second author and Mark Tuttle 
generalize these results and prove that the view of the active processors at 
time I;, together with the fact that the waste is w, completely characterize 
the facts about the operating environment that are common knowledge 
at time t+l-w. 
From Corollary 15 and Theorem 11 we have: 
COROLLARY 16. Let cp be about the initial configuration. Then 
(S,,> P? t + 1 - WP)) b zv iff (ST, PT f + 1 - WP)) b cv. 
3.3. Optimal SBA Protocols 
Corollary 16 shows how crucial a role the wastefulness of a run of Ss 
plays in determining when facts about the initial configuration become 
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common knowledge. In particular, it implies that SBA in run p can always 
be performed at time t + 1 -,/V(p). It is not hard to show that J‘(p, k), 
and hence also the wastefulness of a run of S,s, are a function of the failure 
pattern, and are independent of the initial configuration itself. We can thus 
define w(z), the uaastefulness of a failure pattern z, to be w(p) for some 
run p of S, with failure pattern rc. Consider the protocol 9 (uniform for 
all processors pi) depicted in Fig. I. 
The K in the text of the protocol means “the processor knows,” i.e., it is 
Ki in p,‘s copy of the protocol. This protocol is not a protocol in the tradi- 
tional sense of the word, but rather a knowledge-based protocol, to use the 
terminology of Halpern and Fagin (1988): a processor’s actions at any 
given point are determined by the processor’s knowledge. The runs of such 
a protocol are defined round by round in an inductive manner: Once 
the first 1 rounds of all runs have been defined, the test whether 
Ki(W 2 t + 1 - 1) holds at time I is well defined, and every processor’s 
operations in round I+ 1 are uniquely determined. 
This protocol behaves as a full-information protocol so long as no 
processor executes the halt command. Indeed, a straightforward induction 
on the round number shows that a processor has identical knowledge 
about the initial configuration in corresponding runs of 9 and a full- 
information protocol up to (and including) the point at which it halts in 
the run of 9. Given a run p of 9, let PV= w-‘(p). By Theorem 14, at time 
t + 1 - w(p) it is common knowledge that dir = M:. Thus, in particular, 
every active processor knows that Y#‘” = MI, and hence also that YY 2 t + 1 - 
time. All correct processors thus decide and halt simultaneously at time 
t + 1 -w(p). Corollary 16 implies that some processor knows exist(O) at 
(p, t + 1 - K>) iff all active processors know it at that point, and it thus 
follows that the active processors all decide on the same value. The 
protocol 9 is therefore an SBA protocol. 
The actual implementation of the protocol 9 is rather straightforward. 
A processor’s local state can consist solely of the information it has about 
(i) the initial configuration and (ii) the rounds at which processor failures 
were discovered and the processors to whom messages were not delivered 
in this round. This is a fairly compact representation of a processor’s view, 
PROTOCOL 9 
repeat every round 
send current view to every processor 
untilK(*‘>r+l-lime) 
if K(exist(0)) then decide 0 else decide 1 
halt 
FIG. 1. A knowledge-based SBA protocol. 
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and it is an easy exercise to specify how the local state is updated following 
a round of communication, based on incoming messages and on missing 
messages from failed processors. We now discuss how the tests for 
knowledge are performed. The only way it is known that a faulty processor 
q crashed by a particular round is if some processor is known not to have 
received a message from q in that round. Based on this information, the 
processor can compute whether it knows that d(k) >j for any k, and hence 
whether it knows that %- aj. This is all it needs in order to carry out the 
test to exit the loop in the protocol. Testing whether the processor knows 
exist(O) is done simply based on the information the processor has about 
the initial configuration: The test succeeds iff the processor knows of a 
specific processor that had 0 as its initial value. 
Notice that in runs in which many failures become visible early it is the 
case that SBA is attained by 9 significantly earlier than time t + 1. We are 
aware of no other protocol for SBA that stops before time t + 1 in some 
cases. Theorem 14 implies that the stopping condition K(@- > t + 1 - time) 
implies C(@‘” = t + 1 - time). In fact, Theorem 20 from the next section 
implies that this protocol is equivalent to the protocol 9 depicted in 
Fig. 2. 
As a consequence, we have the following: 
THEOREM 17. The protocol 9 is an SBA protocol that, for all failure 
patterns 71, halts in t + 1 -W(x) rounds in runs that display z. Assuming 
t d n - 2, protocol P is optimal in all runs. 
9’ is just one example of an SBA protocol that is optimal in all runs. We 
now present a standard (not knowledge based) protocol derived from 9 
that is both optimal in all runs and extremely efficient in terms of com- 
munication and computation. The protocol, denoted P”‘, is presented in 
Fig. 3. In this protocol, each processor keeps track of three sets of faulty 
processors, denoted F, RF, and NF. F stands for failures, and keeps track 
of the identity of the failures known to the processor. RF stands for 
reported failures, and NF for new failures. RF consists of the set of 
processors whose failure was reported on in an incoming message in the 
current round. NF consists of the set of processors that the processor 
PROTOCOL 9' 
repeat every round 
send current view to every processor 
until C(exist(0)) v C(exist( 1)) 
if C(exist(0)) then decide 0 else decide 1 
halt 
FIG. 2. A reformulation of 9’. 
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PROTOCOL 9” 
[ Inilializarion: ] 
time + 0, currentPwaste + 0, F + a, NF + 0 
if initialLvalue = 0 then exist;ero + TRUE 
else exisfiero + FALSE 
1 repeat every round 
if existzero 
then message +- (0; NF) 
else message + (A; NF) 
2 send message to all processors 
wait until end of the round 
[ Update variables based on incoming messages: 1 
if some message contained 0 then exikzero c TRUE 
RF t {failures reported in this round) 
diff- IFuRFI-time 
if diff> current_waste then current~waste + diff 
NF + {silent processors not in F} 
F+FvNF 
time + time + 1 
3 until CurrentLwasle = t + 1 - lime 
4 if existzero then decide 0 else decide 1 
5 halt 
FIG. 3. A standard optimal SBA protocol; numbered lines correspond to lines of d. 
discovers to be faulty in the current round. These are simply the processors 
from whom a message was not received in the current round for the first 
time. Observe that by definition NFn F= @, and that the crash failure 
model guarantees that NFz (RF\F). 
First notice that since every processor is required to send a message to 
every other processor in every round of ~9’~ and processors report on all of 
the new failures they discover, a straightforward induction on k can be 
used to show that every active processor knows at time k about the same 
number of failures that have occurred in the first k rounds of the run, in 
corresponding runs of 9 and YSt. The correctness and optimality of 
protocol .?YSt now follow from the properties of 9, together with the fact 
that round I$ + 1 is guaranteed to be clean, where as before R is the greatest 
k satisfying d(k) = W. Since round k + 1 is clean, the number of failures 
that a processor pi knows about at time k, together with the additional 
failures it receives reports about from incoming messages in round l+ 1, is 
exactly N(g). Processor p, will thus set current-waste after round k + 1 to 
d(k) = W. As t + 1 - W 2 fi + 1, it is guaranteed that pi will exit the loop 
at time t + 1 - W. The fact that processors are guaranteed to relay the 
existence of an initial value of 0 as soon as they learn this fact, implies that 
they detect the existence of a 0 at the time of decision in a run of YSt iff 
they do so in the corresponding run of 9’. In summary, all processors 
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decide on the same values at the same times in corresponding runs of P 
and P. As a consequence, Pst is also an SBA protocol that is optimal in 
all runs. 
Finally, let us consider the communication costs of the protocol PSt. 
Every processor sends each other processor a message in every round and 
reports on every failure it learns about exactly once. Thus, the total num- 
ber of bits of information a processor sends any other processor is bounded 
by O(r log n). We conjecture that this is the least amount of communica- 
tion that any SBA protocol that is optimal in all runs can require in the 
crash failure model. 
4. LOWER BOUNDS 
In this section we show that the protocol derived in the previous section 
is indeed optimal in all runs. We do this by showing that nontrivial facts 
about the initial conliguation do not become common knowledge in 
runs of the full information protocol B before time t + 1 - $6”. Given 
Theorem 9, this will complete the claim that the protocol ~3’ of the previous 
section is optimal in all runs. 
Technically, the main result of this section will be that all points (p, I) 
with w(p) < t - I are similar. Intuitively, this says that the only nontrivial 
facts that can become common knowledge in a run p of S, before time 
t + 1 -w(p) are facts about the wastefulness of the run. We begin with a 
lemma that says that if ,w(p) 6 t - 1 and p is the last processor to be 
discovered as faulty in p, then (p, I) is similar to a point in which p does 
not fail, and all other processors behave as they do in p, To make this 
precise we make the following definition: Given a failure pattern rt, the 
failure pattern 7cep is defined to be r - { (p, k(p), Q(p))} if there is a triple 
of the form (P, k(p), Q(P) > m rc, and to be rc if p is not designated to fail 
according to IL Given a run p = $(a, rr), we define pep to be Y(a, n-p). 
We can now show: 
LEMMA 18. Let tdn-2, and fer pES,-.If W(p)dt-l and no 
processor failure is discovered in p in a later round than p’s failure, then 
(P, 0 - (P-p, 0 
Proof: If p does not fail in p then p = p -p, and the claim trivially holds. 
Thus, let k be the round in which p’s failure is discovered in p. By assump- 
tion, no processor failure is discovered in p at a later time. If k > 1 then for 
every pieA(p, I) we have v(p,, p, Z)=v(p,, pPp, I) and thus clearly 
(p, I) - (p-“, 1). It remains to show the claim for k d 1. We do this by 
induction on .j = I- k. 
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Case j= 0 (i.e., k = I). Let qi# q, be two processors in A(p, I). Such 
processors exist by the assumption that t 6 n - 2. Clearly, qi’s view at (p, I) 
is independent of whether or not p sent a message to qj in round 1. Thus, 
(p. I) - (p’, I), where p’ differs from p only in that p does indeed send a 
message to qj in round 1 of p’. (If p sends q, a message in round 1 of p, then 
p = p’.) Now, since p does send q, a message in round I of (p’, I), processor 
4,‘s view at (p’, I) is independent of whether p fails in (p’, I) (it is consistent 
with qis view at (p’, I) that p sends messages to all processors in round I), 
and thus (p’, I) - (ppp, I). By transitivity of - we also have that 
(P, 0 - (P--p, 4. 
Case j > 0 (i.e., k < 1). Assume inductively that the claim holds for j - 1. 
Observe that the choice of p and k implies that A(p, k) = A(p, I). Let 
Q = (ql, . . . . qS} be the set of processors active at (p, k) to whom p fails to 
send a message in round k of p. We prove our claim by induction on s. 
First observe that s > 0, since if s = 0 then p’s failure is discovered only at 
time k + 1, contradicting our assumption about k. We now claim that 
(p, I) - (p’, I), where (p’, I) differs from (p, I) in that p fails to send round 
k messages only to { ql, . . . . qS- i } in p’. Roughly speaking, to obtain p’ we 
first silence processor qS from round k + 1 on, then deliver the round k 
message from p to qS, and finally revive q3. We now make this precise. Let 
p3 be a run that is identical to p up to time k, where processor q5 fails in 
round k + 1 of ps before sending any messages, and no other processor 
failure is discovered in ps after time k. We now argue that no more than 
t processors fail in ps. Since the number of processors that fail in pj is one 
more than the number of processors that fail in p, it suffices to show that 
at most t - 1 processors fail in p. First notice that the number of processors 
that fail in p is .Y(p, k), since p is a run of S, and no failure is discovered 
after time k. Now, d(p, k) d W-(p) < t - 1. Thus, h*(p, k) = d(p, k) + k 6 
t-I+k=t-(I-k).Sinceweareinthecasej>O,wehavel>kandhence 
A-(p, k) d t - 1. It now follows that there are no more than t failures in pS. 
Since pS has the same initial configuration as p and no more than t failures, 
the fact that S, is t-uniform implies that pSe.SF. Clearly W(P,~) 6 t-l, 
since d(p,, k’) = d(p, k’) < t -1 for all k’ < k, and d(p,, k-t 1) = 
Yw(p,,k+l)-(k+l) = JY‘(p,k)+l-(k+l) = d(p,k)&W”(p)bt-1. 
Notice also that no processor fails in p, after round k + 1. Thus, since 
p = psy3, by the inductive assumption on j- 1 (applied with respect to qS), 
we have that (p,, I) - (p, I). Let pin A(p,, I). Clearly pis view at (p,, I) is 
independent of whether p sent a message to qS in round k of p.,. Thus, 
(p,, I) - (p:, I), where pi differs from p, in that p does send a message to 
qS in round k of pi.. Again by the inductive hypothesis for j- 1 we have 
that (pi, I) - (p’, I), where p’ = (p:)-‘$. Processor p fails to send round k 
messages only to s - 1 processors in p’. If s = 1, then p does not fail to send 
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a round k message to any processor in A(p’, k). Hence, p’s failure is only 
discovered at time k + 1 in p’. By the inductive hypothesis for j- 1 we have 
that (p’, I) - (pep, I). By symmetry and transitivity of -, we obtain that 
(p, I) - (p-p, Z),. Let s > 1 and assume the claim holds for s - 1. In this 
case, the inductive hypothesis for s- 1 immediately implies that 
(p’, I) - (pPp, I), and as before we have that (p. I) - (pPp, Z), and we are 
done. 1 
The proof of Lemma 18 depends only on the fact that S, is t-unifom 
and does not use the fact that SF is independent. Notice that the run pPp 
in the statement of Lemma 18 has the following properties: (i) if p is not 
free of failures, then the number of processors that fail in p-p is one fewer 
than in p; and (ii) ?#“(pep) < t - 1. We can now use Lemma 18 to show: 
LEMMA 19. Let t<n-2, let p, plus,--, andassume Z6t. 
(a) rf p and p’ are failure-free runs, then (p, 1) N (p’, 1). 
(b) Zf W(p) < t - 1 and W(p’) 6 t-Z then (p, I) N (p’, I). 
Proof (a) Let p and p’ be failure-free runs. We want to show that 
(P, 4 - (P’, 4. Let Q = {s,, . . . . qs} be the set of processors whose initial 
states in p and p’ differ. We prove by induction on s that (p, 1) N (p’, I). If 
s = 0 then p = p’ and we are done. Let s > 0 and assume inductively that for 
all failure-free runs p” that differ from p’ in the initial state of no more than 
s - 1 processors we have (p’, 1) - (p”, I). If Z= 0, let b be a failure-free run 
that differs from p only in that the initial state of q., is the same as in p’. 
Notice that (p,O)- (fi, 0), since any processor p #q, in A(p, 0) = 
A@, 0) has the same view at both points. For I> 0, we will now silence qs 
from the start, change its initial state, and revive qs. An application of the 
inductive hypothesis will then complete the argument. Let ps be a run with 
the same initial configuration as p, in which qx fails in the first round 
without sending any messages, and no other processor fails. Clearly 
W(p,) =OQ t -I, and by Lemma 18 we have that (p,, I)- (p, I). Let 
p;~A(p,, 1). u(p,, p,, I) is independent of the initial state of qs in p,. Thus, 
(p,, Z)- (pi, Z), where pi differs from ps only in that the initial state of q, 
in p: is as in p’. (Notice that pj E S, because SP is an independent system.) 
Again by Lemma 18 we have that (pi, I)- (p, I), where the initial 
configuration of p is as in pi, and fi is failure-free. Since fi differs from p’ 
only in the initial states of s - 1 processors, by the inductive assumption we 
have that (p’, I) - (6, I), and by the symmetry and transitivity of - we 
have (p, I) - (fi, Z), and we are done with part (a). 
(b) Using Lemma 18, a straightforward proof by induction on the 
number of failures in p shows that (p, I) - (fi, I), for some failure-free 
643/88/z-6 
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run 6; and similarly for p’. The claim now follows from part (a) and the 
transitivity of -. 1 
Remark. Lemma 18 and Lemma 19(a) generalize and simplify the the 
previous proofs of the t + 1 round lower bound on the worst-case behavior 
of SBA in the crash failure model (see De Millo et ul., 1982; Dolev and 
Strong, 1982; Fischer and Lynch, 1982; Hadzilacos, 1983; Coan and 
Dwork, 1986). Whereas the crash failure model is weaker (i.e., is subsumed 
by) most other models of failures, a further weakening of this model is to 
assume that the processors send their messages to other processors in a 
particular order, and an initial segment of the messages sent by a failing 
processor in its round of failure are delivered (cf. Coan and Dwork, 1986). 
Without loss of generality we may assume that the protocol a processor 
follows determines this order as it determines all other actions the 
processor performs. The proof of Lemma 18 works for this model also. The 
only detail that must be added to the proof is that the processor qs6 Q 
should be chosen to be the last processor (among those in Q) to whom p 
sends message in round k. Details are left to the reader. 
Given Proposition 7 and Theorem 9, Lemma 19(b) now allows us to 
completely characterize the runs in which t + 1 rounds are necessary for 
attaining SBA, as well as those that require k rounds, for all k. More 
generally, they provide us with a lower bound on the time by which facts 
can become common knowledge in t-uniform systems. 
THEOREM 20. Let t 6 n - 2, and let S be an independent t-uniform 
system. Let p be a run of S with .failure pattern rt. If q~ is a fact about the 
initial configuration that is not valid in S and 1 <t + 1 - W(~C), then 
(S, P? 0 I= 1cv. 
This immediately implies the following: 
COROLLARY 21. Let t 6 n - 2. No t-resilient protocol for SBA ever halts 
before time t + 1 - W(x) in a run with failure pattern 71. 
Remark. All of our lower bounds have been stated for t B n - 2. While 
the case t = n is uninteresting, there still remains the case of t = n - 1 to be 
dealt with. Results for this case are a bit different than above, because when 
only one active processor remains, it can independently decide even if no 
clean round has occurred yet. Common knowledge of the existence of a 
clean round is no longer necessary for SBA in this case. Rather, it must be 
common knowledge that either a clean round has occurred or there is only 
one active processor. To make a long and slightly technical story short, 
decision can be performed precisely at time n - 1 - w(n) = t - TV. 
Indeed, if we define T= min( t, n - 2}, then all of the results in this paper 
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hold for all t 6 IZ once we replace t by T. We leave the details to the 
interested reader. 
5. APPLICATIONS 
Throughout the paper we have shown how our results regarding when 
common knowledge of various facts is attained in an unreliable system 
affect the SBA problem. We now summarize our investigation of SBA. 
Every failure pattern 71 can be ascribed an inherent waste W(X) such that 
0~ w(n) < t- 1, with the property that no protocol for SBA can reach 
SBA in less than t + 1 - W(Z) rounds in a run that displays the failure 
pattern 71. Furthermore, we have provided a protocol that is guaranteed to 
always reach SBA in exactly t + 1 - “G”(Z) rounds. The analysis presented 
in the previous sections applies to problems other than SBA. In this section 
we discuss some of these applications, in order to illustrate when this type 
of analysis can be used. We start by considering some problems that are 
closely related to SBA. 
5.1. Weak SBA 
The problem of Weak SBA, which differs from SBA in that clause (4) is 
changed so that the active processors are required to decide on a value u 
only if all initial values were o and no processor fails, was introduced by 
Lamport as a weakening of SBA. However, Lemma 19(b) immediately 
implies that the active processors do not have common knowledge of any 
nontrivial fact about the run before time t + 1 - w(n), in any run of a 
f-resilient protocol with failure pattern n. The WSBA requirement is a 
nontrivial requiement, since when the active processors decide 1 they must 
have common knowledge that it is not the case that all processors started 
with 0 and no failure occurred. Thus, WSBA cannot be reached before 
time t + 1 - %‘“(rc). And since SBA can already be performed at time 
t + 1 - W(X), we have that t-resilient protocols cannot attain WSBA any 
earlier than they can SBA. Lemma 19 can also be used to explain why the 
variant of SBA used in this paper (which was introduced by Fischer and 
Lynch, 1982) is essentially equivalent to the original version of the Byzan- 
tine Generals problem of Pease et al. (1980), in which only one processor 
(the source) initially has a value, and the processors need to decide on this 
value if the processor does not fail, and on a consistent value otherwise. In 
this variant of the problem, a simultaneous decision of y implies that it is 
common knowledge that the originator did not both start with initial value 
y’#y and never fail. However, by Lemma 19(b), this fact cannot become 
common knowledge before time t + 1 - #‘“, since there is a reachable point 
(of a run with waste 0) in which the converse holds. 
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5.2. Bivalent Agreement 
It seems to be a folk conjecture that a t-resilient protocol that guarantees 
that a nontrivial action is performed simultaneously must require t + 1 
rounds in the worst case. We now show that this is not the case. Let 
bivalent agreement be defined by clauses (l)-(3) of SBA, and replacing 
clause (4) by: 
4’. At least one run of the protocol decides 0, and at least one run 
decides 1. 
Thus, a t-resilient protocol for bivalent agreement is a protocol I?p with the 
property that all runs of the independent t-uniform system S for B in 
which the set of initial configurations is (0, 1)” satisfy clauses (l)-(3), 
and at least one run of S decides 0, and at least one run decides 1. 
Proposition 7 implies that any action that is guaranteed to be performed 
simultaneously requires some fact to become common knowledge before 
the action can be performed. Theorem 14 implies that at the end of round 
2 of S,: it is common knowledge whether or not the wastefulness of the run 
is t - 1 (i.e., whether f processors were seen to have failed in the first 
round). Thus, we can easily derive a t-resilient protocol for bivalent agree- 
ment: each processor follows g for the first, two rounds and then decides 
0 if it knows that t processors failed in the first round, and 1 otherwise. 
This protocol attains bivalent agreement in two rounds, and Theorem 20 
implies that there is no faster protocol for bivalent agreement so long as 
t < n - 2. (Ray Strong has pointed out that the above protocol can actually 
be used to achieve 2”-’ -valent agreement in two rounds: As we pointed out 
following Corollary 15, in runs with waste t - 1, it is common knowledge 
at time 2 that round 2 was clean. As a result, the whole view of the 
nonfaulty processors at time 1 is also common knowledge. Since this view 
contains the initial values of all nonfaulty processors and there can be 2”-’ 
different configurations of these values, this can be used for such a 
multi-valued agreement in two rounds.) We leave it to the reader to check 
that if t 3 n - 1 then there is a protocol for bivalent agreement that requires 
only one round. Thus, bivalent agreement is a truly easier problem than 
SBA. We note that (Fischer et a/., 1983; Dolev et al., 1983) prove that in 
an asynchronous system there is no l-resilient protocol for an even weaker 
variant of bivalent agreement. 
5.3. Eventual Byzantine Agreement 
We have stressed the connection between common knowledge and 
simultaneous actions. Interestingly, the lower bounds on the time required 
for attaining common knowledge imply worst-case bounds on the behavior 
of t-resilient protocols that perform coordinated actions that are not 
required to be performed simultaneously. For example, eventual Byzantine 
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agreement (EBA) is defined by clauses (l), (2), and (4) of SBA: the pro- 
cessors’ decisions need not be simultaneous (viz. Dolev et al., 1982). There 
are well-known protocols that attain EBA after two rounds in failure-free 
runs (for which OK = 0). However, using Proposition 7 and Theorem 20 
it is not hard to show that a t-resilient protocol for EBA must require t + 1 
rounds in some runs with “lye(rr) = 0. The point here is that a full informa- 
tion protocol can be used to simulate any EBA protocol. Furthermore, it 
is common knowledge at time t whether or not the waste is 0. If an EBA 
protocol decides by time t in all runs with waste 0, then in any such run 
the decision is common knowledge at time r. This would result in the 
existence of a corresponding initial value being common knowledge at time 
t in runs with waste 0, contradicting our lower bounds. More generally, 
one can extend this argument to show that such a protocol must require 
t + 1 -j rounds in some runs with w*(n) =j. This is a refinement of the 
well-known fact that EBA requires t + 1 rounds in the worst case (Dolev 
et al., 1982). Many relevant aspects of EBA are not covered by our 
analysis. We believe that an analysis of EBA should involve a study of 
when the states of E-common knowledge and eventual common knowledge 
(viz. Halpern and Moses, 1984) are attained in systems of unreliable 
processors. This is an interesting open problem. 
5.4. Other Reliability Assumptions 
As our investigation centered around r-resilient protocols, we now briefly 
discuss some other possible reliability asumptions. Recall that Corollary 12 
states that all active processors are guaranteed to have an identical view of 
the system’s initial configuration at time t + 1 in every run of a t-uniform 
system for F. This follows simply from the fact that at time t + 1 it is 
common knowledge that one of the previous rounds was clean. Instead of 
t-resiliency, we could require that a protocol for SBA be guaranteed to 
attain SBA so long as no more than k consecutive rounds are dirty. In the 
system corresponding to all the runs of 9 in which at most k consecutive 
rounds are dirty, it is common knowledge at time k + 1 that a clean round 
has occurred, and F can be converted into a protocol for SBA that is 
guaranteed to attain SBA in no more than k + 1 rounds. This means, for 
example, that if processors in a given system are known to fail at least two 
at a time, SBA can be achieved in t/2 + 1 rounds. Having a bound of k 
consecutive dirty rounds seems in many cases to be a more appropriate 
assumption about a system than having a bound of t on the total number 
of failures possible, since the latter is not a local assumption. Of course, 
these two asumptions are not mutually exclusive, and we may often have 
a small bound on the possible number of consecutive dirty rounds, and 
only a much larger bounds holds for the total number of failures. The 
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smaller bound on the number of consecutive dirty rounds will imply a 
good upper bound on SBA in this case. 
Another way we can consider varying the reliability assumptions about 
the system is by restricting the number of possible processor failures that 
can occur in a round. For example, let us consider the assumption that at 
most one processor can fail in any given round of the computation, and at 
most t processors might fail overall. We are interested in the question of 
whether such assumptions allow us to attain SBA quickly. Unfortunately, 
the lower bound proofs of Lemma 18 and Lemma 19 apply to this 
reliability model. In fact, since all of the runs of such a system are guaran- 
teed to have wastefulness 0, even bivalent agreement cannot be attained in 
any run of the system in less than t + 1 rounds! SBA and WSBA clearly 
require t + 1 rounds in all runs of the system. We now present a somewhat 
artificial variant of this assumption that provides us with a non-uniform 
reliability assumption whose behavior is interesting and somewhat counter- 
intuitive: We say that a protocol for SBA is one visible failure resistant 
(I-VFR) if it is guaranteed to attain SBA so long as no more than one 
processor failure becomes visible to the active processors in any given 
round. The set of possible runs of a protocol d that display such behavior 
will be called a visibly restrained system for 8. It is possible to show that 
in the visibly restrained system for the simple protocol 9 of Section 3 it is 
common knowledge at time 2 whether round 1 is clean, and therefore 
WSBA can be attained in two rounds. However, SBA can be shown to 
require n - 1 rounds in runs of 9 in which one processor fails in every 
round except possibly the (n - 1)th round. (If one adds a bound of 
t d n - 2 on the total number of failures possible, n - 1 is replaced by t + 1.) 
Interestingly, there is a l-VFR protocol for SBA that is guaranteed to 
attain SBA in two rounds (in all runs)! Thus, for the l-VFR reliability 
model, our simple protocol is no longer a most general protocol. The 
reason for the odd behavior of l-VFR protocols is that the patterns of 
failures of the runs that satisfy I-VFR are intimately related to the 
structure of the protocol. Thus, the protocol can restrict the patterns of 
failures possible and make effective use of the l-VFR assumption. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper performs an analysis of the states of knowledge attainable in 
the course of the execution of various protocols in the system, for the case 
of a particular simple model of unreliable distributed systems that is fairly 
popular in the literature. We showed that obtaining common knowledge 
of particular facts was a prerequisite to deciding on a value in the 
simultaneous Byzantine agreement problem. In fact, the problem of deter- 
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mining when facts become common knowledge in systems in which at most 
t processors may fail turns out to be a direct generalization of SBA and 
related problems. By deriving exact bounds on the time at which facts 
become common knowledge, we immediately obtained exact bounds for 
SBA and many other problems. An interesting fact that emerged from the 
analysis is that the pattern in which processors fail in a given run deter- 
mines a lower bound on the time at which facts about the system’s initial 
configuration become common knowledge, with different patterns deter- 
mining different bounds. Ironically, facts become common knowledge faster 
in cases when many processors fail early in the run. As a by-product of the 
analysis, we were able to derive a simple improved protocol for SBA that 
is optimal in all runs. In each and every run, this protocol halts at the 
fastest time possible, given the pattern in which failures occur in the 
particular run. 
Our analysis shows that the essential driving force behind many of the 
phenomena in unreliable systems is the inherent uncertainty that a par- 
ticular site in a system has about the global state of the system. We come 
to grips with this uncertainty by performing a knowledge-based analysis of 
such a system. We stress that our analysis was by and large restricted to 
protocols for simultaneous actions in a rather clean and simple model of 
unreliable systems: synchronous systems with global clocks and crash 
failures. We believe that performing similar analyses for more malicious 
models of failures will prove very exciting and will provide a much better 
understanding of the true structure underlying these failure models, as we11 
as the differences between the failure models. The ideas and techniques 
developed in this paper should provide a sound basis on which to build 
such an analysis, although it is clear that a number of additional ideas 
would be required. 
In summary, the treatment in this paper differs from the usual approach 
to Byzantine agreement type problems in that we make explicit and essen- 
tial use of reasoning about knowledge in order to reach conclusions about 
the possibility or impossibility of carrying out certain desired actions in a 
distributed environment. The generality and applicability of our results 
suggest that this is a promising approach. 
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